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Abstract
The International Criminal Court is empowered by its constituent instrument to request its states parties to
identify, trace, freeze, and seize assets ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued : : : having
due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’. This article critically
examines the approach adopted by the Court to requesting such protective measures at the pre-trial phase,
reflecting on how the rights and interests of the primary stakeholders implicated by this process: (i) accused
persons, (ii) the Prosecutor, (iii) victims, and (iv) bona fide third parties, are safeguarded and balanced.
Keywords: assets; forfeiture; human rights; International Criminal Court; protective measures
1. Introduction
Under Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is able
to request its states parties to identify, trace, freeze, and seize assets ‘in relation to investigations or
prosecutions’.1 Suchmeasures can be requested by the pre-trial chamber, under Article 57(3)(e) of the
ICC Statute, ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued : : : having due regard to the
strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’.2 This article explores the rights and
interests of the four principal stakeholders in this process: (i) accused persons, (ii) the Prosecutor,
(iii) victims, and (iv) bona fide third parties, and reflects on how they are safeguarded and balanced.
If forfeited after conviction, frozen and seized assets can be used to fund reparations to the
victims of the crimes at issue. This function is confirmed by Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome
Statute, which provides that such measures can be requested ‘in particular for the ultimate benefit
of victims’.3 However, asset freezing measures at the pre-trial phase of ICC proceedings are not
*This article is based on a paper given by the author at the 6th Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law,
Junior Scholars’ Workshop, held at Yonsei University in Seoul, Republic of Korea, on 24–25 August 2017. The author is
grateful to Upendra Acharya, Buhm-Suk Baek and Ethan Hee-Seok Shin for critical discussion of the paper. The author also
wishes to thank Nina Jørgensen, Gregory Gordon, Göran Sluiter, Denis Abels and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their
feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.
12002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 93(1)(k).
2Ibid., at Art. 57(3)(e).
3Ibid.
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only a vital tool to enable the enforcement of future reparation awards, but may also be a crucial
element of prosecutorial strategy. The Prosecutor is therefore a second concerned party within the
meaning of the Rome Statute. Third, as accused persons are the direct objects of asset freezing meas-
ures requested by pre-trial chambers, their rights are clearly at stake. A fourth category of stake-
holders whose rights may be affected is third parties, whether persons or entities, who own the
concerned asset(s) and/or who have a right in property in the hands of the accused. This article
critically examines the practice of the ICC with respect to requesting pre-trial protective measures.
Reflecting on the law and practice of the ICC, the article contends that such measures are ulti-
mately essential to enable the court to meet the interests of victims and to fulfil its restorative
mandate. Moreover, even if the ICC were to abandon its restorative aims, such measures are useful
prosecutorial tools. After demonstrating that the Rome Statute system introduces a series of
checks and balances aimed at guaranteeing the rights and interests of the concerned parties during
the pre-trial protective measures process, the article concludes that the ICC’s approach to date has
been progressive and, by and large, consistent. Before turning to the Rome Statute, however, the
article will first briefly discuss the employment of such measures at other international(ized)
criminal tribunals (ICTs) with a view to distilling (some of) the reasons for their utility thereto
in fulfilling their respective mandates.
2. Protective measures at international(ized) criminal tribunals
The power to request pre-trial protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture can also be seen in
the constituent instruments and relevant rules of procedure and evidence of a series of ICTs estab-
lished before and after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. These include Control Council
Law No. 10,4 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),5
the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure applicable before the Extraordinary African Chambers
(EAC),6 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),7 and the
Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office establishing the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers (SPO and KSC).8
4Control Council Law No. 10, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-5, at art. III(1): ‘Each occupying author-
ity, within its Zone of Occupation, (a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of having committed a
crime : : : to be arrested and shall take under control the property, real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons,
pending decisions as to its eventual disposition.’
5Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 31 May 2012 (SCSL RPE), at Rule 104:
‘(A) After a judgement of conviction : : : the Trial Chamber, at the request of the Prosecutor or at its own initiative, may hold a
special hearing to determine the matter of property forfeiture, including the proceeds thereof, and may in the meantime order
such provisional measures for the preservation and protection of the property or proceeds as it considers appropriate. (B) The
determination may extend to such property or proceeds, even in the hands of third parties not otherwise connected with the
crime, for which the convicted person has been found guilty.’ For discussion of its application see Prosecutor v. Norman and
others, Decision on Inter Partes Motion by Prosecution to Freeze the Account of the Accused Sam Hinga Norman at Union
Trust Bank (Sl) Limited or at Any Other Bank in Sierra Leone, SCSL-04-14-PT, T.Ch., 19 April 2004.
6Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 87 bis: ‘Lorsqu’il est saisi d’un dossier d’information, le juge d’instruction peut
d’office ou sur demande de la partie civile ou duministère public, ordonner des mesures conservatoires sur les biens de l’inculpé.’
For its application, see Le Procureur Général v. Hissein Habré, Order for provisional measures, EAC Investigative Chamber, 29
October 2013. See also Le Procureur Général v. Hissein Habré, Judgment, EAC A.Ch., 27 April 2017, at para. 296.
7Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence as amended on 3 April 2017, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8, at
Rule 82 (C): ‘Upon request of the Prosecutor or the Registrar, or proprio motu after having heard the Defence, the Pre-Trial
Judge or the Trial Chamber may request a State or States to adopt provisional measures to freeze the assets of the accused,
without prejudice to the rights of third parties.’
82015 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office No.05/L-053, Official Gazette of the Republic of
Kosovo, No. 27, 31 August 2015, at Art. 39, para. 11: ‘The Pre-Trial Judge may, where necessary, provide for : : : the preser-
vation of assets which may be subject to a forfeiture : : : including temporary freezing orders, temporary confiscation orders or
other temporary measures.’
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The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda
(ICTR), established by the UN Security Council following the end of the Cold War in response to the
mass crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia9 and Rwanda,10 respectively, were also allowed to
order protective measures at the arrest warrant stage. Rule 61(D) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR empowered Trial Chambers to order asset freezing measures, similar
to the powers available to the military tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.11
The Rule 61(D) procedure was first implicated in 1999 in response to an application by the
ICTY Prosecutor to freeze assets belonging to former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Miloševic´,
and his co-accused, Milan Milutinovic´, Nikola Šainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic´, and Vlajko
Stojiljkovic´.12 Responding to the Prosecutor’s application for the freezing of assets,13 Judge
David Hunt ordered all UN member states to ascertain ‘whether the accused (or any of them)
have assets located in their territory and, if so, adopt provisional measures to freeze such assets,
without prejudice to the rights of third parties, until the accused are taken into custody’.14
In discussing the merits of the Prosecutor’s application, Judge Hunt explicitly noted the primary
function of pre-trial asset freezing procedures as ‘preventing an accused who is still at large from
using those assets to evade arrest and from taking steps to disguise his assets or putting them beyond
the reach of the Tribunal’.15 Judge Hunt also accepted the Prosecutor’s submission that a second
function of freezing the assets of accused persons at ICTs is, to facilitate the ‘restitution of property
or payment from its proceeds’.16 In the month after this decision was issued by the ICTY, Switzerland
took measures to freeze assets on its territory belonging to Miloševic´ and his four co-accused.17
Based on the decisions made publicly available by the ICTs empowered to request the imposi-
tion of pre-trial protective measures, it would appear that such requests are rare. However, it is
notable that the power to request such measures has continually been made available to a series of
ICTs established before and after the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002. The following
section will discuss the legal framework at the disposal of the ICC under its constituent instrument
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).
3. Protective measures at the ICC
Article 57(3) of the Rome Statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may: : : :
9UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
10UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
11ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 8 July 2015, UN Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50, at Rule 61; ICTR, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, as amended on 13 May 2015, UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev.23, at Rule 61(D) (‘ : : : Upon request by the
Prosecutor or proprio motu, after having heard the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber may order a State or States to adopt provi-
sional measures to freeze the assets of the accused, without prejudice to the rights of third parties’).
12Prosecutor v. Miloševic´ and others, Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders, Case No.
IT-99-37-I, T.Ch., 24 May 1999 (Miloševic´ and others Decision).
13Though the Prosecutor’s application was initially based upon Rule 54 of the ICTY RPE, Judge Hunt ruled that relief under
Rules 54 and 61(D) may be given ‘for the same reasons’. Miloševic´ and others Decision, supra note 12, at 28. Rule 54 provides
as follows: ‘At the request of either party or proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or
conduct of the trial.’
14Miloševic´ and others Decision, supra note 12, at para. 38.
15Ibid., at 27. See also C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (2012), at 47; R.
Young, ‘Fines and Forfeiture in International Criminal Justice’, in R. Mulgew and D. Abels (eds.), Research Handbook on the
International Penal System (2016), 102, at 104.
16Miloševic´ and others case, supra note 12, at para. 27.
17See Décision de l’Office fédéral de la police dans l’affaire Milosevic Slobodan et autres, 23 June 1999, available at www.
admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/1999/4796.pdf. Frozen assets belonging to Miloševic´ were unfrozen following his death in
March 2006 (see McCarthy, supra note 15, at 47).
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(e) Where a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued under article 58, and having due
regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned, as provided for
in this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, seek the cooperation of States
pursuant to article 93, paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose of
forfeiture, in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims.18
According to Article 93(1) of the Rome Statute, ICC states parties are under an explicit
obligation to comply with requests from the court ‘to provide : : : assistance in relation to
investigations or prosecutions’19 pursuant to their national laws. Subparagraph (k) of the same
provision provides that such assistance extends to ‘[t]he identification, tracing and freezing or
seizure of proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of
eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties’.20
As to the ‘rights of the parties concerned’, the ICC legal framework provides for a series of
safeguards, substantive and procedural, enabling it to strike a fair balance between the interests
of the four primary stakeholders implicated by the pre-trial protective measures process. Here, an
analogy can be drawn between the use of such measures at the ICC and asset freezing by the UN
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Writing about the need for checks and
balances with respect to the latter, Bantekas expresses the following view:
Freezing and confiscation aim to deter the use of assets for the perpetration of criminal offen-
ces by the owner or other persons. Therefore, they are not forms of punishment, especially
given that freezing and confiscation can take place prior to the suspect’s criminal trial. It is
consequently imperative for : : : individual suspects : : : including their representatives and
family members, to have access to procedures that allow them to contest and challenge both
the listing and the administrative measures of freezing and confiscation, even if such pro-
cedures need not be as high as those enjoyed in a criminal proceeding.21
As Bantekas suggests, because (international) criminal proceedings do not share the same ‘admin-
istrative’ character as asset freezing and confiscation under the auspices of the UN Security
Council, the procedural safeguards available with respect to the former ought to be stronger.
Such safeguards can be found in both the Rome Statute and the ICC RPE.
3.1 The evidentiary threshold
One such safeguard can be found in the text of Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute itself. Guariglia
and Hochmayr observe that the initial proposed formulations of this provision, which they note
was added towards the end of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,22 ‘included no clear evidentiary threshold’
for the issuance of pre-trial protective measures.23 Such a state of affairs having ‘caused discomfort
to many delegations’,24 however, the final text agreed in Rome expressly requires that ‘a warrant of
arrest or a summons has been issued’ under Article 58 of the Rome Statute before the Pre-Trial
Chamber can request states to take such measures. The evidentiary threshold required under
Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute must therefore be ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the
18Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 57(3).
19Ibid., at Art. 93(1).
20Ibid., at Art. 93(1)(k).
21I. Bantekas, ‘The International Law on Terrorist Financing’, in B. Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and
Terrorism (2014), 121, at 132.
22F. Guariglia and G. Hochmayr, ‘Article 57’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary (2016), 1421, at 1435.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
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person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’,25 i.e., the same as required by
Article 58(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.26 Should the ‘strength of the evidence’ no longer meet this
threshold, the legal basis for any request issued pursuant thereto would cease to exist.
The ‘strength of the evidence’ has been strictly construed by the ICC. In Kenyatta, ICC Trial
Chamber V(B) took the following factors into account before suspending the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
order to freeze the assets of Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and others:27
: : : the Prosecution’s acknowledgement that it ‘now has insufficient evidence to secure a
conviction at trial’, that any information provided ‘may or may not yield evidence relevant
to this case’, and the directive contained in Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute that the Chamber
pay due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned : : : 28
This straightforward application of the ‘evidentiary threshold’ safeguard found in the text of
Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute is evidently paramount to the rights of the accused. When
viewed in light of the Prosecutor’s failure to bring sufficient evidence to secure a conviction in
Kenyatta, the reasons behind the discomfort felt by a number of delegations when finalizing
the text of the Rome Statute by the lack of a clear evidentiary threshold for the issuance of
pre-trial protective measures29 become even more apparent. Without (the enforcement of) such
a threshold, the measures might have remained in force despite the limited prospects of securing a
conviction and, thereafter, an order for reparations.
3.2 Prior notification and modification
Further safeguards can be found in Rule 99 of the ICC RPE. First, Rule 99(2) of the ICC RPE pro-
vides that, where such notification could not ‘jeopardize the effectiveness of the measures requested
: : : the Registrar shall provide notification of the proceedings to the person against whom a request
is made and so far as is possible to any interested persons or interested States’.30 Schabas argues that
the person against whom a request is made may be the accused person, but ‘may also be the person
or body in possession of the items in question’.31 Parties other than accused persons, the Prosecutor,
and victims may therefore benefit from this safeguard against the potential impact of protective
measures. As Guariglia and Hochmayr observe, giving prior notification would appear to constitute
the exception, rather than the rule.32 The reason behind this is evident: ‘the success of the request
depends on its being undisclosed to the person prosecuted by the Court’.33
Rule 99(3) of the ICC RPE alludes to a second safeguard, namely the possibility that an order
requesting protective measures might be ‘revoked or otherwise modified’.34 Where an order is made
without prior notification under Rule 99(2), the person(s) against whom the request is made – as
well as other interested persons and states – are invited to make observations as to the revocation or
modification thereof ‘as soon as is consistent with the effectiveness of the measures requested’.35
25Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 58(1)(a).
26See Guariglia and Hochmayr, supra note 22, at 1435.
27Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Decision Ordering the Registrar to Prepare and Transmit a Request for Cooperation to the Republic of
Kenya for the Purpose of Securing the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of Property and Assets of Francis Kirimil
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-42-Conf, P.T.Ch. I, 5 April 2011.
28Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, ICC-01/09-02/11-931, T.Ch. V(b),
8 July 2014, at para. 29 (Kenyatta Implementation Decision).
29See Guariglia and Hochmayr, supra note 22, at 1435.
30ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3 (ICC RPE), at Rule 99(2).
31W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2016), at 884.
32See Guariglia and Hochmayr, supra note 22, at 1436.
33Ibid.
34ICC RPE, supra note 30, at Rule 99(3).
35Ibid.
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3.3 The right to appeal
A further due process guarantee available under the ICC legal framework is the right to request
leave to appeal protective measures decisions pursuant to Article 82(1)(b) of the Rome Statute,
which provides as follows: ‘1. Either party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: : : : (b) A decision granting or denying release of the
person being investigated or prosecuted.’36 Though at first glance one might question how
decisions granting or denying the release of accused persons relate to the identification, tracing
and freezing or seizure of assets, this approach was confirmed by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II in
2014. According to Judge Tarfusser:
in light of both its provisional nature and the fact that it relates to one of the fundamental
rights of an accused, a decision on the seizure of assets can be considered as similar to a
decision on the interim release of the accused, which decision can be appealed without
the leave of the relevant Chamber pursuant to article 82(1) (b) of the Statute.37
Pre-Trial Chamber II also observed that ‘a direct right to appeal is also enshrined in article 82(4)
and rule 150(1) of the Rules against orders for reparations issued under article 75, which orders may
also similarly affect the right to property’,38 which, as noted above, it had explicitly acknowledged as
a fundamental right protected by a series of international human rights instruments.
On 28 October 2008, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo applied for the release of additional seized funds,
an earlier application having already been partially granted on 10October 2008.39 Pre-Trial Chamber
III dismissed Bemba’s second application.40 Among other reasons, the Pre-Trial Chamber observed
that the defence team had failed to ‘request leave to appeal the Decision of 10 October 2008’,41
thereby giving weight to the appellate safeguarding mechanism enshrined in the Rome Statute
and the ICC RPE. The right to appeal decisions concerning protective measures therefore serves
two purposes: (1) affording a safeguard against orders against the assets of accused persons that reach
beyond the limits imposed by the ICC’s legal framework; and (2) preventing those whose assets have
been subjected to freezing or seizure measures frommaking successive requests for their release with-
out exhausting all legal avenues at their disposal under the Rome Statute and the ICC RPE.
3.4 The ‘rights of the parties concerned’ and ‘the ultimate benefit of victims’
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that, in applying and interpreting the sources of law at
its disposal, including the Statute and RPE,42 such application and interpretation ‘must be con-
sistent with internationally recognized human rights’.43 Both the Rome Statute and international
human rights law guarantee a series of rights on the part of the accused, while Article 57(3)(e)
explicitly refers to ‘rights of the parties concerned’, which has to include the Prosecutor as the
second ‘party’ to the proceedings. The provision also makes reference to the ‘ultimate benefit
36Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 82(1)(d).
37Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Decision on Mr Kilolo’s ‘Notice of appeal against the decision of the Single Judge ICC-01/05-
01/13-743-Conf-Exp’ dated 10 November 2014 and on the urgent request for the partial lifting of the seizure on Mr Kilolo’s
assets dated 24 November 2014, ICC-01/05-01/13-773, P.T.Ch. II, 1 December 2014, at 5 (Kilolo Notice Decision).
38Ibid.
39Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision on the Defence’s Application for Lifting the Seizure of Assets and Request for Cooperation to
the Competent Authorities of Portugal, ICC-01/05-01/08-251-Anx, P.T.Ch. III, 10 October 2008 (Bemba First Lifting Decision).
40Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision on the Second Defence’s Application for Lifting the Seizure of Assets and Request for
Cooperation to the Competent Authorities of the Republic of Portugal, ICC-01/05-01/08-249, P.T.Ch. III, 14 November
2008, at disposition (Bemba Second Lifting Decision).
41Ibid., at para. 24. See also ibid., at para. 62.
42Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 21(1)(a).
43Ibid., at Art. 21(3).
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of victims’, who hold a unique and significant place in the Rome Statute system of international
criminal justice. Finally, Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute safeguards the rights of bona fide
third parties in the execution of (pre-trial) enforcement measures with a view to eventual
forfeiture.44 The interests of the principal stakeholders in the protective measures process will con-
sequently be addressed in turn.
3.4.1 Accused persons
As the direct objects of the measures, accused persons’ rights are clearly implicated by orders for
protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture issued at the pre-trial phase. The rights
implicated by such measures under Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute include the right to family
life. According to Sluiter, the application of human rights norms to the ‘unique’ circumstances of
ICTs inevitably results in reduced protection for accused persons when compared to the interests
of the prosecution and/or victims.45 It is possible that the freezing and seizure of assets in the
name of an accused person, where the rights and interests of these three participants, as well
as bona fide third parties, must be balanced, could lead to such an outcome, putting assets beyond
the reach of the family members etc. of the person(s) against whom the protective measures are
sought. Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute ought to provide a safeguard against the interpretation of
Article 57(3)(e) in a manner inconsistent with, for example, the right to respect for private and
family life.46 Other rights of the accused that could potentially be implicated by the imposition of
pre-trial protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture include the right to the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions47 and the right to a fair trial (i.e., to be defended by counsel of one’s
own choosing).48
The rights of the accused, as well as those of other interested stakeholders, could also be
impacted by the ex parte status of requests or decision for protective measures concerning assets
that may later be the object of forfeiture measures. Such potential prejudice was acknowledged by
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga: ‘ex parte procedures are only to be used exceptionally when they are
truly necessary and when no other, lesser, procedures are available, and the court must ensure
that their use is proportionate given the potential prejudice to the accused’.49 This proportionality
assessment must take into consideration the interests of victims in obtaining reparations in
the event of a conviction as well as the interests of the Prosecutor in securing the effective execu-
tion of the measures requested. It is therefore difficult to contest the application of ex parte
proceedings in order to safeguard the rights of the accused in the protective measures process,
an argument underscored by the reality that the rights of the accused in terms of participation
are fewer during the pre-trial phase of proceedings before the Court compared with the later stages
thereof.50
44Ibid., at Art. 93(1)(k).
45G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights Protection in the ICC Pre-Trial Phase’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice
of the International Criminal Court (2009), 459, at 461.
46As protected in, e.g., 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 213
UNTS 2889, at Art. 8.
47As protected in, e.g., 1952 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 262, at Art. 1. The protection of this fundamental right was also explicitly acknowledged by Pre-Trial
Chamber II in Kilolo Notice Decision, supra note 37, at 5.
48As protected in, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 67(1)(b) and ECHR, supra note 46, at Art. 6.
49Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the procedures to be adopted for ex parte proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-1058, T.Ch.
I, 6 December 2007.
50Compare the rights afforded to persons during an investigation under Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 55 and those
granted to the accused pursuant to Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 67. On the application of the former see C. Hall and D.
Jacobs, ‘Article 55’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary
(2016), 1394, at 1395–6.
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3.4.2 The Prosecutor
As noted by Judge Hunt in theMiloševic´ and othersDecision,51 the primary function of an order to
freeze the assets of an accused person is to facilitate their arrest. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a
scenario where an offer to unfreeze the assets of an accused person who remains at large could be
utilized as a tool to negotiate voluntary surrender.
Asset freezing can also disrupt ongoing and prevent future criminal conduct within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. The commission of international crimes frequently goes hand-in-hand
with the purchase of weapons and supplies, payments to troops, as well as other potentially
lucrative activities, including the trafficking of persons, arms, and narcotics, all of which require
the availability of – and access to – (financial) assets.
In addition, financial records may provide evidentiary links between individuals and/or groups,
which can assist the Prosecutor in proving, for example, the aiding and abetting of crimes. Such
records can be obtained through the identification of assets belonging to accused persons pursuant
to the procedures in Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.
Discussing the role of the Prosecutor with respect to measures under Article 57(3)(e) of the
Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, having noted that the Prosecutor had not, at the time of
its Decision, transmitted requests for co-operation to states parties with respect to identifying,
tracing, or seizing Lubanga’s assets, expressed ‘the view that, as the organ of the Court primarily
in charge of the investigation : : : the effectiveness of the reparation system would greatly benefit
from the Prosecution’s due consideration of this matter during the investigation stage.’52
The interests of the Prosecutor in requesting protective measures during the investigative
phase, in the view of Pre-Trial Chamber I, are therefore also linked to future reparations, which
may later be found to be payable to victims if the accused is found guilty. It is to the interests of the
victims of the crimes at issue that the following section will turn.
3.4.3 Victims
Victims play a prominent role in proceedings at the ICC, with broader rights than those
afforded by earlier ICTs. The International Military Tribunal (IMT) established at
Nuremberg, with substantial input from American jurists, focused on punishing individuals
for mass crimes within a predominantly adversarial framework.53 However, after the Cold
War, victim-oriented provisions were included in the legal frameworks of a number of
ICTs and, most significantly for the purposes of the present article, that of the permanent
ICC. The post-Cold War era also saw significant developments in international human rights
law, including recognition that victims of serious violations have a right to reparation.54 Evans
identifies ‘growing attention to victims within national criminal justice systems and : : : a
reaction to criticism of the manner in which victims’ concerns were considered by the
ICTY and the ICTR’ as influential factors leading to the adoption of the Court’s victim
reparations regime.55 As Zegveld observes:
With the establishment of the ICC, for the first time in history, individuals can submit
claims of a private law nature to an international court. In contrast to the ICTY and
ICTR, the ICC may award reparations for the benefit of individual victims. It may do
so directly against a convicted person. This reparation may take the form of restitution,
51Miloševic´ and others Decision, supra note 12, at para. 27.
52Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 58, ICC-01/04-01/06-1-
Corr-Red, P.T.Ch. I, 10 February 2006, at para. 141 (Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision).
53See L. Zegveld, ‘Victims’ Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts: Incompatible Values?’, (2010) 8 JICL 79,
at 86–7. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) reprised this largely retributive model.
54See, e.g., C. Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (2012).
55Ibid., at 87–8.
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compensation and rehabilitation. The ICC can act on an application of a victim or excep-
tionally on its own motion.56
Although not full parties to the proceedings before the ICC in the same way as victims are able
to participate before certain national courts or at other ICTs, including the EAC and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the interests of victims are evidently
paramount to the protective measures procedures found in Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute
and Rule 99(1) of the ICC RPE.
3.4.4 Bona fide third parties
Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that states parties are obliged to assist
the Court in identifying, tracing, freezing, and seizing assets ‘without prejudice to the rights of
bona fide third parties’.57 However, these rights are not further elaborated in the Rome Statute
or the ICC RPE.58 Nevertheless, such third parties constitute a relevant category of stakeholders
in the pre-trial protective measures process. For example, their interests, not least their right to
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, could be implicated in two situations. First, the third
parties could be in possession of asset(s) belonging to the accused person(s), which could con-
sequently be subjected to pre-trial protective measures. Second, the third parties could have a
right in property which, at the time the ICC requests protective measures, is in the hands of the
accused. Goldsmith and Linderman claim that such third parties could include owners, cred-
itors, purchasers, business partners, and joint tenants, among others.59 The interests of bona
fide third parties must consequently also be safeguarded alongside those of the accused, the
Prosecutor, and any potential victims. The following section aims to provide an examination
of how the ICC has given effect to these rights and interests and, where they are in competition,
how it has sought to balance them in its decisions involving persons accused of committing
crimes under its jurisdiction.
4. The ICC practice
Much of the Court’s practice regarding pre-trial ‘protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture’
remains confidential. However, pre-trial chambers have issued requests for such measures against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,60 Germain Katanga,61 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,62 Uhuru Muigai
56Zegveld, supra note 53, at 88.
57Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 93(1)(k).
58See M. Stiel and C. -F. Stuckenberg, ‘Article 109: Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures’, in M. Klamberg (ed.),
Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court (2017), 704, at 705, note 810: ‘The only ground for refusal to
enforce fines and forfeiture orders mentioned in the Statute is prejudice to the “rights of bona fide third parties”, an
expression nowhere defined in the Statute or RPE. Hence, it seems that national courts have to determine which rights
are relevant and when a party qualifies as bona fide, which not only deviates from inter-State practice but may result in
an uneven application.’ See also K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law Volume III: International Criminal
Procedure (2016), at 655–6.
59M. Goldmsith andM. J. Linderman, ‘Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform’, (1989) 5
DukeLJ 1254, at 1257.
60See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the identification,
tracing, freezing and seizure of property and assets belonging to Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-22-tEN, P.T.Ch.
I, 9 March 2006; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Request to States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Identification, Tracing and Freezing
or Seizure of the Property and Assets of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-62-tEN, P.T.Ch. I, 31 March 2006.
61See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the identifica-
tion, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-7-tENG, P.T.Ch. I, 7
August 2007.
62Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision and Request to the Republic of Portugal for the purpose of obtaining the identification,
tracing, freezing and seizure of property and assets, ICC-01/05-01/08-8, P.T.Ch. III, 27 May 2008 (Bemba Seizure Decision).
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Kenyatta and others,63 and Aimé Kilolo Musamba. It was also reported in November 2011, by
then ICC Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo, to the UN Security Council, that ‘[t]he Court ha[d] sent
: : : requests for assistance to Libya, State Parties, and five UN Security Council non-State Parties
to identify, trace, seize and freeze all the personal assets belonging to the suspects’,64 namely Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi.65 The following section will examine the practice of
the Court with respect to requests for measures under Article 57(3)(3) of the Rome Statute and the
relevant RPE, to the extent that its decisions and orders have been classified as public.
4.1 The purpose of protective measures and the range of assets susceptible thereto
Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, which governs forms of co-operation that the Court can
request from states parties, does not explicitly provide that the latter should assist the Court in iden-
tifying, tracing, freezing, and seizing assets for the purpose of reparations; rather, such measures can
be requested ‘for the purpose of eventual forfeiture’.66 This said, Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute
explicitly refers to the ‘ultimate benefit of victims’ in the context of the pre-trial chamber requesting
‘protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture’ pursuant to Article 93(1)(k).67 On a restrictive
reading of Articles 93(1)(k) and 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, one could conclude that such meas-
ures ought to be targeted only at ensuring the enforcement of the penalty of forfeiture in the event of
a conviction. Such a narrow reading would have accorded minimal weight to the ‘ultimate benefit of
victims’ in the pre-trial protective measures process, other than those who might have a claim to
forfeited ‘proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly’ from the crime(s) of which the
accused was convicted in accordance with the forfeiture procedures contained in the Rome
Statute.68 Such an interpretation was considered, but ultimately rejected, by Pre-Trial Chamber
I in Lubanga,69 which instead opined as follows:
As the power conferred on the Court to grant reparations to victims is one of the distinctive
features of the Court, intended to alleviate, as much as possible, the negative consequences of
their victimization, it will be in the “ultimate interest of victims” if pursuant to article 57 (3) (e)
(of the Rome Statute), the cooperation of States Parties can be sought in order to take protective
measures for the purpose of securing the enforcement of a future reparation award.
In the Chamber’s view, the reparation scheme provided for in the Statute is not only one of
the Statute’s unique features. It is also a key feature. In the Chamber’s opinion, the success of
the Court is, to some extent, linked to the success of its reparation system. In this context, the
Chamber considers that early tracing, identification and freezing or seizure of the property
63Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Decision Ordering the Registrar to Prepare and Transmit a Request for Cooperation to the
Republic of Kenya for the Purpose of Securing the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of Property and Assets
of Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-42, P.T.Ch. II, 5
April 2011 (Kenyatta Seizure Order).
64L Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Prosecutor’s statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to
UNSCR 1970 (2011)’, 2 November 2011, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=statement%20by%20luis%
20moreno_ocampo%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20t.
65Ibid.
66Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 93(1)(k).
67Ibid., at Art. 57(3)(3).
68Ibid., at Art. 77(2): ‘In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order: : : : (b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and
assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.’
69Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision, supra note 52, at para. 132: ‘The Chamber notes that, although a first reading of article
57(3)(e) of the Statute might lead to the conclusion that cooperation requests for the taking of protective measures under such
a provision can be aimed only at guaranteeing the enforcement of a future penalty of forfeiture under article 77(2) of the
Statute, the literal interpretation of the scope of such provision is not clear, because of the reference to the “ultimate benefit
of the victims”’.
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and assets of the person against whom a case is launched through the issuance of a warrant of
arrest or a summons to appear is a necessary tool to ensure that, if that person is finally
convicted, individual or collective reparation awards ordered in favor of victims will be
enforced. Should this not happen, the Chamber finds that by the time an accused person
is convicted and a reparation award ordered, there will be no property or assets available
to enforce the award.
In the Chamber’s view, existing technology makes it possible for a person to place most of
his assets and moveable property beyond the Court’s reach in only a few days. Therefore, if
assets and property are not seized or frozen at the time of the execution of a co-operation
request for arrest and surrender, or very soon thereafter, it is likely that the subsequent
efforts of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Prosecution or the victims participating in the case
will be fruitless.70
But this conclusion by Pre-Trial Chamber I was not the end of the matter, with the issue again
coming to prominence in the case against Kenyatta and others.
Following disclosure to the public of confidential information, including to the accused, Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta, on 21 October 2014, ICC Trial Chamber V(b) reclassified as public a series of docu-
ments concerning pre-trial protective measures in the cases in the Situation in the Republic of
Kenya.71 On 5 April 2011, in the case against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,
and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber II ordered the Registrar, in consultation with
the Prosecutor, to request co-operation from Kenya ‘for purposes of identifying, tracing and freezing
or seizing the property and assets belonging to or under the control of Francis Kirimi Muthaura,
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide
third parties’ and to regularly inform the Chamber of any action taken in the execution of this order.72
However, the Government of the Republic of Kenya refused to execute the order. In its
submissions, the Kenyan Government expressed the following view:
: : : the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Order lacks legal basis and should be revoked. It reiterated its
view that Articles 93(1)(k) and 57(3)(e) of the Statute, as well as Rule 99 of the Rules, read
together, provide three basic pre-requisites which must be satisfied prior to making a request
for cooperation under these provisions: (i) that the criminal offences have been proven, after
a full trial; (ii) that the Court found that the person obtained the proceeds, property and
assets directly or indirectly from the commission of the crime: and/or (iii) that in committing
the crime the accused person employed the property and assets identified.73
Trial Chamber V(b), by majority, Judge Henderson dissenting, rejected the submission that, when
requesting protective measures, a nexus is required between the assets and the commission of the
crime(s). According to the Trial Chamber:
70Ibid., at paras. 135–7 (footnotes omitted). See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision Establishing the Principles and
Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, T.Ch. I, 7 August 2012, at para. 277: ‘The identification
and freezing of any assets of the convicted person are a fundamental element in securing effective reparations, and pursuant
to Article 93(l)(k) of the Statute, State Parties should provide the Court with timely and effective assistance at the earliest
possible stage of the proceedings.’
71Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Order concerning the public disclosure of confidential information, ICC-01/09-02/11-967, T.Ch.
V(b), 21 October 2014.
72Kenyatta Seizure Order, supra note 63, at disposition.
73Kenyatta Implementation Decision, supra note 28, at para. 10, citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Submissions of the
Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to the ‘Order for Submissions on the Implementation of the Request regarding
the Freezing of Assets’, ICC-01/09-02/11-923-Conf-Corr, T.Ch. V(b), 28 May 2014, at para. 12.
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The Majority observes that Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute is broadly phrased and allows a
Chamber to request cooperation from a State in implementing protective measures in respect
of proceeds, property and assets, and ‘instrumentalities of crimes’. The text makes no dis-
tinction concerning whether such property or assets must have been derived directly or in-
directly from a crime, as explicitly required under Article 77(2)(b) of the Statute. Read
plainly, a request for protective measures in respect of property or assets does not require
a nexus between the crimes for which the accused is summoned, charged or convicted, unless
it is made solely for the purposes of Article 77(2)(b) of the Statute. In addition, even in those
circumstances, any determinative finding as to actual nexus between the proceeds, property
or assets in question and crimes could only be made under Article 77(2)(b) of the Statute
after conviction.74
In Kenyatta, Trial Chamber V(b) adopted a broad interpretation of the Rome Statute and RPE
in confirming that assets subject to protective measures include those without any nexus to the
crimes of which the accused person is suspected, unlike proceeds, property, and assets susceptible
to the penalty of forfeiture, which, pursuant to Article 77(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, have to be
‘derived directly or indirectly from that crime’.75 However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Judge
Henderson expressed the view that Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute and Rule 99(1) of the
ICC RPE do not allow the pre-trial chamber to request protective measures for the purpose of
an order for reparations,76 presenting a challenge to the Court’s earlier findings in Lubanga.
According to Judge Henderson:
I do not read the phrase “in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims” contained in
Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute as expanding the authority of the Pre-Trial Chamber under
that Article beyond that which is expressly stated. Rather, I see this phrase as an acknowl-
edgment that in taking the significant step of prospectively freezing or seizing the property
or assets of a person who is presumed innocent, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall take into
consideration – in addition to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the accused
person – whether such measures would in particular be for the ultimate benefit of the
victims : : : In my view, this objective can be effectively achieved by the Pre-Trial
Chamber requesting protective measures for the purposes of eventual forfeiture, which
in appropriate circumstances can be transferred to the Trust Fund and thereafter used
for the benefit of the victims in an award for reparations, as provided in the plain text
of Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute.77
Here, Judge Henderson questions the broad interpretation given to the pre-trial protective
measures procedures in the Rome Statute and RPE by the majority of Trial Chamber V(b) in
Kenyatta, whose view is consistent with that adopted by Pre Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga
and Katanga cases. Judge Henderson’s concern is valid. Though the reading of Article
57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute adopted in the Court’s earlier case law broadens the range of assets
susceptible to protective measures with a view to funding potential future reparations, this has
implications for accused persons, who, at the pre-trial stage, must be presumed innocent and re-
main entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.
In Kilolo, Judge Schmitt, on behalf of Trial Chamber VII, interpreted Article 57(3)(e) of the
Rome Statute in the same manner as Pre-Trial Chamber I in Lubanga and the majority of
74Kenyatta Implementation Decision, supra note 28, at para. 16.
75Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 77(2)(b).
76Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Henderson, ICC-0l/09-02/11-931-Anx, T.Ch. V(b), 8 July 2014.
77Ibid., at paras. 5, 7.
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Trial Chamber V(b) in Kenyatta, thereby refusing to endorse the narrower interpretation
proposed by Judge Henderson in his Dissenting Opinion in the latter case.78
The issue was ultimately settled by the Appeals Chamber, which confirmed the approach of the
Kenyattamajority, in February 2016.79 Importantly, the Appeals Chamber notes that ‘the freezing
of assets constitutes a provisional protective measure which must be applied in a manner consis-
tent with Article 21(3) of the Statute’.80 It might therefore be expected that when such measures
are imposed or subject to review, the chamber in question would take the rights and interests of
the accused and any bona fide third parties, as well as the ultimate benefit of victims, into con-
sideration. Particularly persuasive in the judgment of the Appeals Chamber is its discussion of the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute as it pertains to reparations to victims.81 Unlike the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL, all of which had the power to order protective measures but where victims could
only claim compensation ‘in a national court or other competent body’,82 the ICC is authorized by
Article 75 of the Rome Statute to order reparations directly to the victims of crimes under its
jurisdiction.83
After observing that the Rome Statute also provides for an enforcement mechanism under
Article 75(4) and Article 109 of the Rome Statute,84 the Appeals Chamber concluded:
an interpretation of the Statute that brings the property and assets of the suspect or accused
person that will be potentially subject to reparations orders in the event of conviction within
the scope of protective measures under Articles 57 (3) (e) and 93 (1) (k) of the Statute con-
solidates the effectiveness of the reparations system and is thus consistent with the object and
purpose of the Statute.85
By clarifying the interpretation of these provisions, the Appeals Chamber has given legal certainty to
the implicated stakeholders. According to Ferstman, the decision of the majority in Kenyatta, and, it
is argued, its confirmation by Judge Schmitt in Kilolo and by the Appeals Chamber, was ‘a progres-
sive interpretation of the statutory framework which should encourage legal representatives of
victims to actively engage with the OTP and the relevant chambers on the issue of asset orders,
for the ultimate benefit of victims’.86 In other words, by broadly interpreting the protective measures
provisions in the Rome Statute and ICC RPE to take into account orders for reparations, the Court
has demonstrated its commitment to the ultimate benefit of victims in Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome
Statute. The following section examines how the Court has balanced this consideration with the
rights and interests of other stakeholders in the pre-trial protective measures process.
4.2 Balancing competing rights and interests in the protective measures process
The ultimate benefit of victims may be in direct competition with the rights and interests accruing
to other parties concerned in the Article 57(3)(e) process. Competing rights and interests can be
78Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Decision on the ‘Requête de la défense aux fins de levée du gel des avoirs de Monsieur Aimé
Kilolo Musamba’, ICC-01/05-01/13-1485-Red, T.Ch. VII, 17 November 2015 (Kilolo Lifting Decision), at paras. 17–18.
79Prosecutor v. (Redacted), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of (REDACTED), ICC-ACRed-
01/16, A.Ch., 15 February 2016.
80Ibid., at para. 53.
81Ibid.
82Ibid., citing ICTY RPE, supra note 11, at Rule 106 (B); ICTR RPE, supra note 11, at Rule 106 (B); SCSL RPE, supra note 5,
at Rule 105 (B).
83Ibid., referring to Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 75 and ICC RPE, supra note 30, at Rule 94.
84Ibid., referring to Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Arts. 75(4), 109.
85Ibid.
86C. Ferstman, ‘Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: The Freezing, Seizing and Transfer of Assets for the
Purpose of Reparations’, in O. Bekou and D. J. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: Perspectives
from Theory and Practice (2016), 227, at 236.
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identified most clearly in the Court’s case law as between the Prosecutor and victims on the one
hand and accused persons and their family members on the other. While the Prosecutor and vic-
tims may have a shared interest, albeit perhaps for different reasons, in seeing protective measures
ordered (or maintained), accused persons and their dependents may have reasons to request that
such measures be denied (or rescinded). In cases where rights and interests are found to be in
competition, the Court is able to apply the legal framework at its disposal in order to strike a fair
balance between them.
On 24 May 2008, Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was arrested near Brussels by Belgian authori-
ties following the issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC.87 On 27 May 2008, four days after his
arrest warrant was issued, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III, noting, inter alia, Article 57(3)(e) of the
Rome Statute and Rule 99(1) of the RPE, issued a request for co-operation to Portugal to identify,
trace, freeze, and seize any property and assets belonging to Bemba located on its territory, subject
to the rights of bona fide third parties.88
Bemba’s application for legal assistance having been rejected because he was found not to be
indigent,89 his defence counsel requested a partial lifting of the seizure order.90 On 10 October
2008, Pre-Trial Chamber III requested the competent Portuguese authorities ‘to authorise tem-
porarily the release of the amount of €36,260 on a monthly basis from (Bemba’s) account
[REDACTED] in Portugal as of 1 October 2008 until a decision on the confirmation of charges
has been issued’.91 These funds were released (i) to enable Bemba to cover fees payable to his
defence team and (ii) to support his family. Pre-Trial Chamber III reasoned as follows:
As to the expenses for the Defense of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba, the Chamber underlines that the
disclosure process has just started. The Chamber takes note that the Defence team has to
analyse in a short period of time a significant amount of documents. The Chamber considers
that at this stage of the proceedings, it is critical that the Defence has adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of the confirmation hearing which is scheduled to take place
on 4 November 2008.
Furthermore, as to the expenses of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba to support his family, the Chamber
acknowledges that he has financial obligations to his family and must be able to pay for the
basic needs of his wife and children.92
Although Pre-Trial Chamber III did not engage in a lengthy discussion of the right(s) of the
accused at issue, i.e., the rights to respect for private and family life and to a fair trial, respectively,93
it can be argued that its acknowledgment of Bemba’s familial obligations and the ‘needs of his wife
and children’ implicitly recognizes this right, guaranteed under international human rights law
and, consequently, Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. This is not to say that a more extensive
discussion of the rights of the accused was necessarily merited in the case at hand. Because
Bemba’s application for lifting the freezing of assets remains confidential at the time of writing,
it cannot be discerned whether he alleged any violation thereof. The manner in which this issue
87Prosecutor v. Bemba, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-1-tENG, P.T.Ch. III, 23 May
2008.
88Bemba Seizure Decision, supra note 62, at para. 4 and disposition.
89Prosecutor v. Bemba, Registrar’s Decision on the Application for Legal Assistance paid by the Court Filed by
Mr Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-76-tENG, P.T. Ch. III, 25 August 2008.
90Prosecutor v. Bemba, Application for Lifting the Seizure, ICC-01/05-01/08-81-Conf-tENG, P.T.Ch. III, 26 August 2008.
91Bemba First Lifting Decision, supra note 39, at disposition.
92Ibid., at paras. 15–16.
93Cf. the extensive discussion of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights by the ICC Presidency in
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Reasons for the decision on the Applications for judicial review of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo of
10 and 11 November 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-310, Presidency, 5 December 2008, at paras 32–43.
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was addressed by the Court thus cannot be found wanting in this respect. Nor can it be claimed
that the Decision fails to take the rights afforded to Bemba and his family under international
human rights law seriously.
This issue again came to light in Bemba’s request for the release of further seized funds.
According to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s decision disposing of the application:
Firstly, counsels of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba requested the lifting of seizure or freezing of €
78,900 on a monthly basis starting on 1 October 2008 to cover both his financial obligations
to his family as well as to his counsels. Secondly, the Defence estimated that it would need
€100,000 to cover its investigation activities. Thirdly, the Defence requested €234,000 in or-
der to cover Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba’s family expenses and his counsels’ fees from the date of
his arrest in the Kingdom of Belgium until September 2008.94
Pre-Trial Chamber III rejected Bemba’s application,95 emphasizing that he had failed to ‘demon-
strate any change of circumstances in [his] financial situation : : : since 10 October 2008 and : : :
support [his] Second Application with any documentation such as official invoices’.96 It can there-
fore be reasonably assumed that, had Bemba demonstrated such a change in his circumstances
(i.e., presumably to his detriment), supported by sufficient documentary evidence, the Pre-Trial
Chamber might not have dismissed his application. This seems to be a perfectly reasonable
application of the legal framework, balancing the interests of the accused (and his family) with
those of the Prosecutor and victims.
This balance again came to the fore in the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, specifi-
cally as concerns Mr Kilolo, a former member of Bemba’s defence team.
On 20 November 2013, Judge Tarfusser, designated as single judge on behalf of ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber II, ordered the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido for their alleged commis-
sion of offences against the administration of justice.97 Pursuant to this order, Belgium seized a
bank account under its jurisdiction in Kilolo’s name.98 Kilolo’s defence argued that the seizure of
his assets was contrary to the Rome Statute. Among other reasons, he submitted that the seizure
infringed his right to family life.99
Judge Schmitt, sitting as single judge, rejected Kilolo’s request in its entirety.100 As to Kilolo’s
argument that the seizure of his assets violated his right to family life, Judge Schmitt reasoned as
follows:
As a provisional measure under Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute, the freezing of assets (and its
maintenance) must be applied in a manner consistent with Article 21(3) of the Statute. The
single judge is attentive to Mr Kilolo’s argument that the (maintenance of) seizure of said
bank account would infringe his right to family life insofar as he purportedly cannot meet
his financial obligations towards his family, including his young children. However : : : the
single judge is unconvinced that this provisional measure infringes upon Mr Kilolo’s right to
family life. The single judge recalls that the measure was justified as it was taken in
94Bemba Second Lifting Decision, supra note 40, at para. 8.
95Ibid., at disposition.
96Ibid., at para. 24.
97Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-01/05-01/13-1-tENG, P.T.Ch. II, 20 November 2013.
98Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 78, at para. 2.
99Ibid., at para. 15, referring to Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Addendum à la ‘Requête de la défense aux fins de levée du gel des
avoirs de Monsieur Aimé Kilolo Musamba’, ICC-01/05-01/13-1014-Conf-Exp, T.Ch. VII, 28 July 2015, at paras. 15, 28.
100Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 78, at disposition.
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accordance with the law and for a legitimate aim : : : The single judge also finds that the
measure is proportionate vis-à-vis the legitimate aim pursued.101
In Kilolo, unlike in Bemba, Trial Chamber VII explicitly confirmed that, in applying and inter-
preting Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute and Rule 99(1) of the ICC RPE, both of which are
primary sources of law under Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC must take steps to ensure
their consistency with ‘internationally recognized human rights’,102 an important safeguard in the
protective measures process. Judge Schmitt, in keeping with the Court’s general practice,103 fol-
lowed the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with regard to limiting the
exercise of the right, in this instance, to the peaceful enjoyment of (private and) family life. In
other words, he assessed whether the protective measure: (i) ‘was taken in accordance with
the law’;104 (ii) ‘for a legitimate aim’;105 and (iii) whether it was ‘proportionate’ to that aim.106
Here, Judge Schmitt uses the approach of the ECtHR to interpret Article 21(3) of the ICC
Statute and his reasons for rejecting Kilolo’s request are numerous and clear. According to
Judge Schmitt:
Mr Kilolo was released from detention in October 2014 and joined his family in Belgium. He
also confirms that he resumed his profession as a lawyer in Brussels. Mr Kilolo is not sub-
jected to any condition which unreasonably impedes the exercise of his profession and, thus,
provide for his family. No further specific arguments are provided which demonstrate that
Mr Kilolo lacks the means to support his family financially. As a result, the single judge finds
that Mr Kilolo’s right to family life is not unduly interfered with.107
As to Kilolo’s request for a partial lifting of the seizure order, Judge Schmitt rejected the request as
inappropriate. He reasoned:
As explained above, Mr Kilolo’s personal circumstances allow him to provide for his family.
Considering the amount seized, a monthly release of [REDACTED] would significantly re-
duce the sum contained in said bank account, thus rendering the provisional measure mean-
ingless. No other measures appear available which would adequately ensure that the Court’s
interests underlying the seizure order would still be protected in the event that the seizure
were to be partially lifted.108
Though the Single Judge rejected the accused’s request, it cannot be said that the ultimate benefit
of victims was unfairly prioritized above the rights of the accused and his family members in this
Decision. Judge Schmitt identifies a number of legitimate aims pursued by the protective measures
ordered against Kilolo. These include the need to preserve the assets for the enforcement of a pos-
sible penalty of forfeiture in the future,109 to meet any potential obligations on Kilolo’s part vis-à-vis
101Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 78, at paras. 21–2 (footnotes omitted).
102Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 78, at para. 21.
103On which see A. Jones, ‘Insights Into an Emerging Relationship: Use of Human Rights Jurisprudence at the International
Criminal Court’, (2016) 16 HRLRev 701, at 724; N. Croquet, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence
Rights: A Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?’, (2011) 11 HRLRev 91; and V. Nerlich, ‘Article 21
(3) of the ICC Statute: Identifying and Applying “Internationally Recognized Human Rights”’, in P. Lobba and T. Mariniello
(eds.), Judicial Dialogue on Human Rights: The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals (2017), 73, at 82.
104Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 78, at para. 22
105Ibid.
106Ibid.
107Ibid.
108Ibid., at para. 23.
109Ibid., at para. 17.
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‘other types of forfeiture’, i.e., an order for reparations,110 to secure the assets ‘in order to meet -
potential fine orders of the Court’,111 and to enable the ICC to recover the costs of Kilolo’s legal
assistance should he be found to have had the means to cover such expenses.112 Judge Schmitt then
reasons that Kilolo is able to continue his work as a lawyer, the proceeds of which he deems sufficient
for the support supporting his family,113 rendering the protective measures proportionate to these
aims. Finally, the Single Judge observes that no measure other than the continued seizure of
Kilolo’s assets would protect ‘the Court’s interests underlying the seizure order’.114 In other words,
the interests of the Prosecutor (in enforcing potential future fines and orders for forfeiture) and
the ultimate benefit of victims (in seeing that reparations awards are enforced in the event of a con-
viction) can only be safeguarded through the maintenance of the protective measures. On the other
hand, in the view of Judge Schmitt, the interests of Kilolo in meeting his financial obligations towards
his family can be met through the continued exercise of his profession, which is not inhibited by the
ongoing seizure of his assets. Had Kilolo shown that he ‘lack[ed] the means to support his family
financially’,115 it would appear reasonable to assume that Judge Schmitt would have decided otherwise.
The ICC’s publicly available case law with respect to protective measures has therefore been
largely consistent. Assets susceptible to requests for protective measures have not been restricted
by the Court to those with a link to the crimes(s) with which an accused person is charged.116
Further, where conflicting rights and interests have been identified, the Court has applied and
interpreted the various safeguards included in the Rome Statute and RPE in a clear and transpar-
ent fashion, and, moreover, in fulfilment of its duty to do so in a manner that is ‘consistent with
internationally recognized human rights’.117
5. Concluding remarks
Pre-trial ‘protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture’ are not unique to ICTs. Their
availability and use can be seen in the national legal systems of states with both common and
civil law legal traditions, including in Senegal, as discussed above.118 But international criminal
proceedings are not national criminal proceedings. Investigations and trials at the international
level generally take much longer than domestic criminal cases. According to a 2013 study by Alette
Smeulers, Barbora Hola and Tom van den Berg, the average length of time between the issuance of
the indictment and trial judgment at nine international(ized) criminal tribunals was 4.9 years,
while the average trial length was 2.9 years.119
110Ibid., at para. 18.
111Ibid., at para. 19.
112Ibid., at para. 20, citing ICC RPE, supra note 30, at Rule 21(5): ‘Where a person claims to have insufficient means to pay
for legal assistance and this is subsequently found not to be so, the Chamber dealing with the case at that time may make an
order of contribution to recover the cost of providing counsel.’
113Ibid., at para. 22.
114Ibid., at para. 23.
115Ibid., at para. 22.
116On which see L. van den Herik, ‘The Individualization of Enforcement in International Law: Exploring the Interplay
between United Nations Targeted Sanctions and International Criminal Proceedings’, in T. Maluwa, M. du Plessis and D.
Tladi (eds.), The Pursuit of a Brave New World in International Law: Essays in Honour of John Dugard (2017), 234, at
260: ‘Article 75(4) of the ICC Statute seems to indicate that protective measures solely for reparation purposes can only
be made after conviction. Yet, in practice, Pre-Trial Chambers have effectively ordered the identification, tracing, freezing
or seizing of assets already in the pre-trial phase with a view to rendering the reparation system effective. In case of a request
for protective measures for reparation purposes, there is no requirement that the assets have a nexus with the crime.’
117Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 21(3).
118See Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at Art. 87bis.
119A. Smeulers, B. Hola and T. van den Berg, ‘Sixty-Five Years of International Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures’,
(2013) 13 IntlCLR 7, at 16–18. The study provides empirical data gathered from the IMT, the IMTFE, the ICTY, the ICTR, the
ICC, the SCSL, the ECCC, the STL, and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes.
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This is not to say that international(ized) criminal trials take too long. Indeed, it has been ar-
gued that ICTs may be generally regarded as more ‘efficient’ given the complexity of the cases
before them.120 But the time required for international criminal proceedings to reach completion
can lead to problems with respect to assets frozen at the arrest warrant phase, an example of which
can be seen in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. At the time of his arrest, unlike most other
suspects apprehended by the Court as of the time of writing, Bemba had accumulated significant
assets including a luxury private jet, as a result of his successful ‘business empire’.121 As of March
2012, it was reported that this aircraft, which had already lost its flightworthiness, had accumu-
lated more than €126,000 in parking fees at Faro Airport, which would likely surpass the value of
the aircraft in the near future.122 On 8 June 2018, Bemba was acquitted of the charges brought
against him by the Court’s Prosecutor123 and his defence has subsequently requested that any
freezing orders against his assets be lifted.124 If successful in this application, Bembas’s aircraft
will presumably be unfrozen and be of negative value as a result of the parking charges accumu-
lated during his time in detention in The Hague, which, at the time of his acquittal, amounted to
over ten years. It is therefore evident that the implications of decisions taken under Article
57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute and Rule 99 of the ICC RPE are potentially far-reaching.
The Rome Statute and ICC RPE include a series of due-process guarantees in respect of protective
measures, the application of which can be clearly seen in the ICC’s case law. Those most clearly
affected are accused persons, the Prosecutor, potential victims, and bona fide third parties. The three
factors to be considered by the pre-trial chamber under Article 57(3)(e) are: (i) the strength of the
evidence; (ii) the rights of the parties concerned in the process; and (iii) the ultimate benefit of vic-
tims. Consequently, although not ‘parties’ to proceedings to the same extent as the Prosecutor and
accused persons, victims’ interests are given significant weight in the ICC legal framework as con-
cerns protective measures. This is also borne out through an analysis of the Court’s case law.
In discussing the most suitable approach to balancing the rights of accused persons with the
rights of victims before the ICC, Zappalà expressed the following opinion:
it is often difficult to strike the proper balance between conflicting interests on a case-by-case
basis. The case-by-case approach creates problems of consistency in the treatment of differ-
ent defendants, which in turn threatens the principle of equality before the law.125
This article has sought to demonstrate that the Court has in its publicly available case law applied
the safeguards in its legal framework with an even hand. From this jurisprudence, the parties to,
and other participants concerned with, the protective measures process are able to seek largely
consistent guidance with respect to ongoing (and future) proceedings pertaining to the protective
identification, tracing, freezing and/or seizure of assets. Given the interests at stake, the Court’s
approach to protective measures is praiseworthy.
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